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The efficacy of electric utility regulation has not been finally determined.
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of Commission regulation on the level of earnings realized by electric power utility firms. Previous studies have relied upon price data which were generated during the very early days of utility regulation; moreover, cross section analyses, aggregating firms controlled by diverse regulatory regimes, were employed for assessing the effects of regulation.
Time series data for the individual electric firms operating in Florida, Iowa, and Mississippi were used in the analysis. These are the only three states regulated since World War II and it was possible to compare profit rates for the individual firms before and after Commission regulation was instituted and to make an assessment of the effect of the charge in each casethe data for each firm are for the period 1943 through 1976. The results show that firms in the sample were earnings economic profits prior to regulation and that regulation is responsible for substantial reductions or total elimination of those profits.
Public policy recommendations and the significance of the results for the various theories of regulation are also presented.
INTRODUCTION
Criticism cf utility regulation may now be at a peak; however, the efficacy of the process has been the subject of considerable skepticism through the years. The criticism, in general, rests on the alleged grounds that regulation accomplishes very little or nothing at all.
Electric utility regulation has existed in the U.S. since the early 1900' s, but there is little convincing evidence that the perfor- That support is appreciated. Ed Eubny and Andy Jaske provided excellent research assistance.
-2-The growing concern with regulatory processes, and the emerging climate calling for deregulation of business, generates a need for additional knowledge concerning the performance of firms in the electric utility industry. If regulation, in fact, generates little or no positive social benefit, abolition or reform of the institution would probably be a policy prescription; therefore, assessment of utility regulation is an important undertaking and that is the main objective of this study.
Previous studies concerning regulation have generated mixed results; some have found it to be a relatively unimportant institution. Econometric studies may be challenged on several grounds, so it is important to continue to generate research which will eventually permit an overall assessment of commission regulation. The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of commission regulation on earnings realized by electric utility firms. Although the efficacy of the regulation process cannot be determined by the absence of economic profits alone, control of earnings is clearly an important objective of the institution.
Indeed, Kahn explains that regulated profits are the most obvious and com-3 forting evidence that regulation can be "effective.
The results of this investigation show that firms in the sample were earning economic profits prior to regulation and that regulation is responsible for substantial reductions or total elimination of those excessive profits.
3 Alfred E. Kahn -3-
PREVIOUS STUDIES
In a landmark study, G. Stigler and C. Friedland examined the impact of electric utility regulation on rates charged and rates of return earned. They found that regulation of electric utility firms, as indicated by the presence of a state regulatory Commission, ing to the explanation of interstate rate differences.
The study explains that the ineffectiveness of regulation stems from two sources.
(1) Individual utility systems do not have any significant long-run monopoly power, and (2) the regulators cannot force the utility to operate at a specified combination of output, price, and cost. The authors make some inferences from their price examinations and conclude that pure monopoly profits would not occur in the absence of regulation. -6-As profits increase for these firms, there may be an increasing tendency for the staff of the regulatory authority to "suggest" price reductions or improvements in service, often in response to external pressures from citizens' groups or politicians. Thus, although there is a constraint tending to limit continual growth of profits, it appears to be a much looser kind of constraint than much of the theoretical literature might lead one to believe. Regulated firms do appear to respond to this moral suasion from time to time, because the regulatory authority has the power to force a formal regulatory review and firms feel that they will do better in the long run if they keep the Commission happy by filing a rate reduction from time to time rather than by waiting for the Commission to come after them.
The above discussions indicate that effective regulation would be expected to reduce the profit levels of electric utility monopolists.
The residential natural gas price faced by an electric utility monopolist would also affect its profit level. Since gas is a substitute for some important electric utility applications, such as heating and clothes drying, one would expect a direct relationship between profit rates and natural gas prices. As Spring, 1973, p. 123. This relationship would not necessarily hold in a gas-electric combination company. In this situation, the firm is a monopolist both for gas and electricity and sells both services in a given city. Consequently, a consumer facing a higher price for natural gas may change to electricity but the same firm would continue to earn profit from selling the substitute energy to him. The net effect on profitability, in this case, depends upon both how the regulatory commission discriminates between gas and electric prices and the extent of consumer responses to price changes. Electric utility regulation is based on "cost-plus-profit" proce- dure. Under this form of regulation, the utility firm is permitted to recover all costs of operation. Earnings are generated by the firm being allowed to earn a fair return on its investment. Consequently, all taxes, operating expenses, and depreciation are recoverable by the utility firm, then a fair return on investment is added as compensation 18 to investors. ' To the extent that consumer rates are established on a previous test year basis, future expected costs are the costs involved in the rate determination procedures, not costs actually incurred by the firm during the relevant operating year. Joskow has also indicated the need for regulatory adjustments and presents an "inflation premium" hypothesis.
In an effort to make up losses that result from regulatory lag in an inflationary world the Commission may allow a higher proportion of "corrected" firm requests during periods of rapid inflation than it would in a period of relatively stable prices.
Joskow presents regression results which give some support to his "inflation premium" hypothesis.*" Given the rate making procedure of utility companies, one would expect per unit profitability to be unaffected by production expenses.
If the regulated price is just compensating the utility firm for its production costs, one would expect rising or falling production costs to have a neutral effect on per unit profitability. If Profitability of publicly owned electric firms is discussed in Patrick Mann "Fublicly-Owned Electric Utility Profits and Resource Allocation" Land Economies , November, 1970, pp. 478-484. 29 The question examined is how effective is regulation; not, how effective is effective regulation. PE/S = Production expense in dollars per 1000 kwh.
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The usual arrangement was that firms were regulated at the local level by some sort of city commission prior to state commission regulation.
One study found local regulation even less effective than state commission regulation. The results mean that profits are higher for these firms as costs increase.
The coefficient of the REG variable reveals that Commission regulation has caused lower profits for four of the six Iowa firms included in the sample. direction, indicating that higher natural gas prices cause profits of the electric utilities to increase. These firms are electric monopolies but they do not sell natural gas, as in the case of the firms from Iowa. Consumers substituting electricity for natural gas when gas prices rise would increase the profitability of electric firms.
The RGAS coefficients in the equations were significant at the five percent level or better. 
CONCLUSIONS
Commission regulation has lowered rates of return earned by electric utility firms included in this study. These are all important matters which require rigorous research.
APPENDIX Data Sources
All data are from Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the U.S . except the gas price data. Gas price information was obtained from Gas Facts .
The state average prices for residential natural gas was obtained by taking state residential gas sales revenue (in thousands of dollars) and dividing that number by state residential gas quantity sold (in trillions of BTU's).
The GNP implicit price deflator was taken from the Economic Report of the President.
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